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“The More of Them Are Killed the Better”
racial identity and noncombatant immunity in civil war
new mexico
James M. Bartek

“E

xcuse my bad writing for I am in a very great hurry,” Texas artillerist
Frank Starr apologized to his father in early October 1861. “It is
rumored that we march next monday—where to I do not know but I suspect
towards New Mexico.” Penned with palpable anticipation from Camp Sibley
outside San Antonio, Texas, this brief letter presaged a significant expansion
of the American Civil War, which most Americans assumed would last no
more than a few weeks when the conflict started in April. Stalemated in the
East, some Southerners looked to the Southwest for the decisive encounter
that would secure the independence of their country, the Confederate States
of America. New Mexico Territory, which included all of present-day Arizona, seemed ripe for the taking. The subsequent campaign to expand the
Confederate empire, however, did not go unchallenged. Union volunteers
blunted the rebel advance at the Battle of Glorieta Pass in March 1862 and
eventually secured the territory for the United States.1
Unsurprisingly, the conduct, if not overall strategy, of the New Mexico
campaign seemed to mirror in large degree the events taking place in the
East: Americans fought Americans and make-shift hospitals overflowed with
casualties. Historians even retroactively dubbed the single climactic encounter at Glorieta Pass the “Gettysburg of the West.” As in the East, the ethos of
“civilized” warfare among the combatants tempered the ferocious fighting:
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Prisoners of war were granted quarter, the wounded were tended, and soldiers
often ruminated on the inherent humanity of their enemy. At least in one
glaring regard, however, the New Mexico campaign differed drastically from
the events unraveling on the other side of the Mississippi River. A policy of
military restraint toward civilians, however tenuous, continued to hold sway
in the East, at least through 1863. Anglo American soldiers encountering
enemy civilians tended to adopt, with important exceptions, relatively mild
retributive policies. Despite inflammatory rhetoric demanding that the
enemy’s country be laid to waste, Union and Confederate soldiers stopped
far short of total devastation. In New Mexico and Arizona, however, Union
and Rebel troops encountered not Anglo Americans but Hispanic Americans
among the civilian population. Both armies, in effect, became occupiers of
a “foreign” land, and the multiracial Southwest ultimately exposed the shallowness of Anglo notions toward “civilized” warfare. Uniformly denounced
as treacherous “greasers” or “indolent” peons, native New Mexicans fell
prey to Northern and Southern volunteers who plundered and destroyed
with abandon. Far from pillaging for the sake of pillaging, volunteers were
in fact making a profound social statement concerning the values and ideals
of mid-nineteenth-century Anglo America.2
The Southwest in 1860
In 1860 the preponderance of U.S. Army regulars were scattered in companysized detachments throughout the West. Chasing down Indians only occasionally interrupted an otherwise monotonous life of road building, fort
construction, and parade drill. The secession crisis demanded soldiers play
a much greater role. In response to the rebellion, the federal government
transferred a significant number of troops to the East. Some western forts were
completely abandoned while others were handed to hastily raised volunteer
units. The inevitable confusion left the remaining Union defenders vulnerable. With all eyes fixed on eastern battlefields, federal help would not be
forthcoming should a crisis arise.
Some Southerners, Texans especially, deemed New Mexico Territory too
great a prize not to exploit. Annexing the territory would bring the South one
step closer to becoming a continental nation. With New Mexico secured, so
went the conventional wisdom, it was only a matter of time before California
threw in its lot with the Confederacy—significant discontent with the federal
government among Californians lent plausibility to the scenario—or was
conquered in turn. Already stretched thin on the Atlantic Coast, the Union
Navy would be hard pressed to blockade Pacific ports effectively, leaving the
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South with virtually unfettered access to international trade. The capture of
southwestern gold and silver mines would guarantee a steady flow of precious
metals at the expense of the Union war effort. Most importantly, significant
gains in the Southwest might win the foreign recognition Southern leaders so
desperately sought. If the plans seemed grandiose, they at least corresponded
with an overall Confederate national strategy of winning independence from
the Union. A few ambitious Texans considered the conquest of New Mexico
merely the first stage of an even grander design: the creation of a Confederate
empire in Latin America.3
The philosophy of expansionism was a potent force during the 1850s. As
the rancor of sectional politics increased, Texans’ historical yearning for
territorial aggrandizement neatly coalesced with a more general Southern
desire to expand the institution of slavery. For many proponents, expansion
seemed the only way to ensure slavery’s survival. The drive for the expansion of slavery gained urgency after the election of 1860, which brought to
power a Republican administration that advocated immediate containment
as a road to eventual abolition. If safeguarding slavery required expansion,
federal opposition to slavery’s extension required southern secession. In
October 1860, the Weekly Sun in Vicksburg, Mississippi, insisted, “The
Southern States once constituted as an independent Republic, the acquisition of Mexico, Central America, San[to] Domingo, and other West [Indies]
Islands would follow as a direct and necessary result.” The newspaper’s
editor concluded that the Gulf of Mexico could be made into a “Southern
lake.” For Texas nationalists, the prospect of unhindered expansion was
equally attractive, although advocates invariably couched the benefits in
more provincial terms. “We must have [the northern Mexican states of]
Sonora and Chihuahua,” declared James Reily, a future officer for a Texas
volunteer regiment. “With Sonora and Chihuahua we gain Southern California, and by a railroad to Guaymas render our State of Texas the great
highway of nations.” The improbability of the success of such schemes did
not prevent them from gaining widespread acceptance, and the possible
extent of southern power appeared limited only by the imagination. Not
by accident, the Knights of the Golden Circle, a secretive organization
dedicated to the creation of a slavery empire in Latin America, found its
greatest support in Texas.4
The desire to expand slavery to the west and south was simply one
component of the much larger phenomenon of manifest destiny. Hardly
limited to Southerners, the belief that American values and institutions
were destined to spread across the North American continent and perhaps
the hemisphere had been a driving force since the United States’ inception.
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Americans touted their country as a paragon of republicanism or democracy
and an exemplar of freedom. Other peoples, they assumed, would only
benefit from American tutelage. But as might be expected of a country that
simultaneously espoused the equality of man and tolerated racial slavery, its
philosophy about its continental destiny was rife with tensions and contradictions. Civilizing the savage and enlightening the ignorant too often equated
with intolerance, subjugation, or extermination.
Nor would those peoples subjected to American “enlightenment” have
much choice in the matter. The United States ruthlessly demonstrated what
manifest destiny meant in regard to Mexicans in 1846. Upon seizing all of
northern Mexico, Americans determined that uplifting such an “indolent”
people might not be possible or even desirable. In 1848, Lorenzo Thomas,
a U.S.-Mexico War officer and future Civil War general, surmised, “The
people are addicted to gaming, & robbing is common to the mass—men
take office here for plunder, so that all have become corrupt, and it is very
evident that they are incapable of good government.” He continued: “It
is perfectly evident to me that this people are doomed to pass off, and at
no distant day. . . . The hardy and nobler northerners are destined . . . to
over run [sic] this section of North America, even if peace now should be
made.” Thomas spoke not of enlightenment but of indefinable extinction.
An inferior and feeble “race” (Mexicans in this case) would simply “pass
off,” leaving the country in the hands of “hardy” Anglo Americans. Immutable racial flaws made Mexicans incapable of improvement and therefore
unworthy of the land they possessed. This rationale, popularized during
the Texas Revolution in the mid-1830s, justified an aggressive war for territory in 1846, underpinned racially motivated atrocities against Mexican
civilians, and later served as the basis for relegating Mexican Americans to
second-class citizenship. Above all, then, manifest destiny stood for racial
exploitation and Anglo supremacy.5
The hostilities between Texas and Mexico that began in the mid-1830s
and those that started between the United States and Mexico a decade later
left Anglo Americans with a decidedly negative image of their southern
neighbors. The Civil War reinforced that view. Union volunteers, dismissive
of native New Mexicans, often treated them more as a hostile population
than as American citizens. Hispanic peoples had not “passed off” as predicted
but neither had they been fully assimilated into American society. Indeed,
for many soldiers, New Mexico appeared much too similar to Old Mexico.
Meanwhile, Confederate volunteers, with Texans in the vanguard, clearly
meant to assume the mantle of expansionism that had seemingly been cast
aside by the United States during the 1850s.6
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A Degraded and Indolent Race
Although preoccupied with the rigors of an active campaign, the volunteers
who descended on the Southwest in 1861 and 1862 still found ample time to
ruminate on the Hispanic people they encountered. Whatever their political,
social, or ideological differences, Northern and Southern soldiers found common ground in their estimation of Mexican Americans, looking upon them
with condescension or outright contempt. Volunteers scrutinized every aspect
of Hispanic culture and often concluded that it was not much of a culture
at all. That opinion heavily influenced their subsequent treatment of their
Hispanic hosts. California volunteer Eli W. Hazen, for example, managed
to dismiss the entire territory of Arizona as a place where “every bush had a
thorn, every toad a horn, and every woman was a whore and every man was a
lying Gambling horse thief.” Santa Fe, the capital of New Mexico, particularly
struck Coloradoan Alonzo F. Ickis as an especially unsavory place. “[F]ound
it a poor town of 10,000 Greasers,” he wrote his brother. “The town supports
one Presbyterian and two Catholic churches but I do not think they exercise
any good influence over the people. Santa Fe is one grande (excuse the expression) brothel.” Confederates were no more forgiving. “From the day we left
Mesilla all eyes were strained to get a peep at Santa Fe,” wrote a Texan in
early 1862. “Imagine our astonishment! Instead of a fine city, a group of mud
cabins—instead of neatness and beauty, loathsomeness and filth,—instead
of intelligence, the grossest ignorance. What a capital for a great nation.”7
Such opinions were widespread, and those who proffered them expressed
certainty that the shortcomings they observed had everything to do with
a flawed New Mexican character. While Confederate brigadier general
Henry H. Sibley outfitted his Army of New Mexico near San Antonio in
September 1861, many of his volunteers, especially the East Texans, used
the opportunity to explore the historic town. Regardless of its cosmopolitan
attractions, Pvt. W. Randolph Howell of the Fourth Texas Mounted Volunteers thought San Antonio suffered from a major drawback: “It has the
worst mixed population I have ever seen—Americans, Germans, Mexicans,
and any sort of people you want to see.” He continued, “They look like
a greatly degraded people, the most of them—The Mexicans especially.”
The notion of Mexican degradation—that people of Mexican descent were
somehow tainted, corrupted, or impure—was a common pronouncement.
The source of that degradation was racial miscegenation. Ovando J. Hollister,
a volunteer in the First Colorado Infantry, rather disdainfully hypothesized
that New Mexicans represented “a cross between the Spaniard and Indian,
though the latter greatly predominates.”8
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Whatever their racial origins—and soldiers speculated voluminously
on this point—Mexicans clearly stood apart from the Anglo race. Custom,
culture, religion, language, and especially skin color and physical appearance
branded them as different and inferior. “Mexicans,” declared Texan Ebenezer
Hanna, “have a certain degree of civilization in their manners and appearance
which does not exceed the common class of the half-civilized Indians of the
Indian Territory.” Labeling New Mexicans as half-civilized, however, was not
meant to explain their condition. The expression merely served as another
way to describe their situation, to accentuate and exaggerate the differences
between Anglo and Mexican Americans. Coloradoan George Aux made
abundantly clear that soldiers considered the chasm virtually unbridgeable.
After a white lieutenant of a New Mexican regiment ordered several members
of the First Colorado tied to a wagon for killing an ox, Aux declared that
inflicting such punishment on American volunteers was unacceptable. “If I
had been one that . . . was tied, the Liut would not tied a nother after he had
tied me,” he boldly informed his wife. “He is Leut of a Mexican Co[mpany]
and he thinks that we ar [sic] all greesers [sic], I think he will soon find out
that we ar not greesers but whit [sic] men.”9
As some of the previous comments suggest, one of the most enduring and
prominent images clouding the Anglo mind in regards to Mexicans was that
of the “indolent” Mexican, an obvious counterpoint to the “industrious”
American. Accusations of laziness often accompanied a litany of other
condemnations, but it seemed a principle cause of Mexican backwardness.
Hollister could only attribute the poverty he saw before him to intentional
Mexican sloth. “One would almost think they scrimped themselves to save
work,” he insisted. “They seem destitute of ambition or enterprise. Laziness
is their most marked characteristic.” Yet even the laziest of people require
some means of survival, and according to volunteers, the primary vocations of
most New Mexicans were gambling, cheating, thievery, or outright banditry.
Soldiers contended that ignorance also seemed to be a pervasive problem.
For some, it appeared that Mexicans lacked the mental capacity to appreciate
fully their own plight—a circumstance often attributed to a domineering
and oppressive Catholic Church. To Anglo volunteers, the prevalence of
Catholicism among native New Mexicans was another peculiarity that
marked them as a lesser people. They derided the Catholic faith witnessed
in New Mexico as mere “superstition” and its practitioners as “heathens.”10
Regardless of the pervasiveness of the church in Hispanic culture, Anglo
soldiers still discerned a great deal of immorality among New Mexicans, an
accusation common to racialist thought. Sexual promiscuity, in particular,
seemed endemic. “This is a decidedly fast town by moonlight,” Ickis
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complained of Santa Fe. “Licentiousness is deemed a virtue and but few
Mexicans are without sexual disease in some form. I believe there are but
few but what inherit disease.” The Anglo charge of moral failings among
New Mexicans hardly originated with objective observation but rather
stemmed from a Mexican culture that clashed with soldiers’ own Victorian
sensibilities. As a way to distance themselves further from a half-civilized
people, Americans passed moral judgments on what were in fact nonmoral
situations (such as public bathing), imputing to Mexicans an immorality and
lewdness that bolstered their own sense of virtue. The stereotypical image
of the lascivious Mexican woman, a construction of the prudish American
mind, became the stuff of legend. That stereotype was at once alluring and
repulsive, romantic and erotic.11
Despite this ambivalence, or perhaps because of it, encounters between
soldiers and local women occurred regularly, according to the soldiers who
described them. One Confederate insisted that Texans never “appropriated”
a woman without her consent. Union sources, too, admitted to the intimate
relationships that developed between soldiers and señoritas. Nevertheless,
no matter how cordial or consensual the relationship, soldiers tended
to objectify in sexual terms the women whom they encountered. While
Coloradoans denounced the entire territory as a “grande brothel,” Texans
often “appropriated” women as they would a mule. Union and Confederate
soldiers who left written records almost always viewed them as objects of
sexual revulsion or desire, condemning them as sexual deviants or coveting
them as spoils of war.12
This attitude produced predictable results. A Unionist native New Mexican
noted with despair the rowdy conduct of Confederate colonel John Baylor’s
men soon after they entered the territory in August 1861 and “hoisted their dirty
banner.” Although the Texans guaranteed that the citizens would be safe, the
New Mexican discovered that the pledge was “granted, in word only, because
the same night all of their creatures went around forcing open doors, raping
women and girls, and the least they have done to us is plunder us until we
have nothing left.” His testimony is notable, not least because Baylor’s men
have heretofore enjoyed a reputation for orderly conduct. Similar charges
also arose against both Sibley’s Texans and the Union volunteers who expelled them, suggesting a pattern of sexual abuse and violence against New
Mexicans. Comparable reports of Confederate and Union forces (excluding
guerrilla units) preying on Anglo women were practically nonexistent. Gender
norms among Anglo soldiers in the Southwest varied little, particularly in
regard to properly conducting themselves toward women, but their behavior
was complicated by the issue of race. In the eyes of white troops, not only did
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Mexican women flout acceptable behavior with their alleged licentiousness,
but their status as the non-Anglo “other” undermined any defenses that their
gender might have afforded them. Volunteers, especially Texans, entered New
Mexico under the banner of manifest destiny, carrying with them a sense of
entitlement to the land and its resources. Many Union and Confederate soldiers
viewed the appropriation of Mexican women as their racial prerogative.13
Just as Mexican women appeared to lack some crucial element of femininity, so too did Mexican men seem to be missing an integral component of
masculinity. Charges of cowardice and rank opportunism went hand in hand.
As early as August 1861, Union colonel Edward R. S. Canby doubted that native New Mexicans would assist their country in defending the territory. One
of his majors, William Chapman, complained that they were “more afraid
of the Texans than they are of death, and in case of an attack . . . I cannot
rely upon them.” Union volunteers who might have expected New Mexican
help to repel the Confederate invasion quickly came to the same conclusions.
The people simply lacked the fortitude necessary to protect themselves. As a
detachment of the First Colorado Volunteers approached one village, Hollister observed panicked residents who could not distinguish whether the
impending force represented friend or foe. “We struck the river just below
an outlandish Mexican town; whose inhabitants fled, like any other cattle,
and hid in the corn,” Hollister recorded with contempt. Confederate soldiers
disparaged Hispanic New Mexicans at an even higher pitch. One volunteer,
in a letter to a local paper, warned his countrymen against complacency in the
coming conflict. “Texans may have easily conquered the Mexican and Savage
foe by their dauntless valor, but the case is far different now.” Although the
Mexican resistance might be easily brushed aside, conquering New Mexico
would require the besting of a much more formidable white American foe.
One participant noted, for example, that “our enemy has the same Norman
blood—greatly exceeds us in numbers, and will be thoroughly disciplined
before giving us battle.”14
Treachery, not bravery, represented the flip side to Mexican cowardice.
For Union volunteers, treachery usually signified nothing more than banditry.
For Confederate Texans, who used the term with far more frequency than
Union volunteers did, it was a pejorative heavy with historical baggage. The
phrase “treacherous Mexican” conjured images not of simple banditry but of
past cruelties inflicted by Mexicans upon Texans, including the Alamo, the
Goliad massacre, the debacle and torment of the Texas Santa Fe Expedition
of 1841, and the Cortina Wars in 1859 and 1861. The image was synonymous
with barbarity, inhumanity, and murder, all threats to the very foundations
of Anglo Texan civilization.
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The symbolism of the Texas Revolution and the specter of Mexican
treachery remained powerful motivational forces for Sibley’s volunteers. As
they gathered in San Antonio, the launching point of the campaign, they
acknowledged the historical significance of the place. “[We] pitch our Camp
on Alamo Plaza,” noted Pvt. William W. Heartsill, “and immediately in front
of the old Alamo Church, where Davy Crockett and his brave comrades were
inhumanly butchered by the Greasers.” The Texas volunteers’ discovery of
Union authorities in New Mexico recruiting native Hispanics raised their ire
to new heights. “We did not care to fight the New Mexicans,” one participant
insisted, “but they have dared to raise their arms against us. . . . Those who
have read the stirring history . . . can easily appreciate the feelings of Texans
who find the same men in arms against us. They will call upon their patron
saints in piteous tones to save them from the just indignation and vengeance
of the ‘Tejanos.’” Unlike Union volunteers, Confederate Texans clearly had
a score to settle with Nuevomexicanos. Although they did not go into battle
crying “Remember the Alamo,” they clearly recalled that their ancestors had
done so. Vengeance, then, served as a significant force in their actions toward
New Mexicans.15
Obviously, many Anglo soldiers considered New Mexicans a degenerate
people beyond redemption. Not only did they seem culturally and racially
inferior, but their existence posed an obstacle to the march of Anglo American
progress. “This valley if settled by white citizens . . . would be one of the richest
Valleys in the world,” declared Texan Frank Starr, “but if it remains peopled
by this degraded race of Mexicans and Indians, it will forever remain in its
present condition.” For those soldiers holding such a belief, the next logical
step was the dislocation, subjugation, or even eradication of the Mexican
American population. At the least sign of resistance, Anglo volunteers could
completely dehumanize New Mexicans as “brute beasts” or “treacherous”
cowards, transforming even a minor annoyance into a virulent threat. When
Coloradoans apprehended a New Mexican who they suspected of spying for
Sibley’s Confederates, an incredulous Ickis reported: “He is a greaser and
‘plays insane.’ Perhaps stretching his neck would have the desired effect.
It would be no sin if he was an insane Mexican for the more of them are
killed the better the country is off.” Too often, however, what volunteers
considered “resistance” was simple survival to New Mexicans. With no
profound attachment to the United States and a bitter enmity toward Texas,
New Mexicans rightly feared two unsympathetic Anglo armies flowing into
the territory, consuming scarce supplies, impressing livestock, and creating the inevitable hardships that always followed in the wake of a military
campaign.16
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The New Mexico Campaign
When General Sibley petitioned Confederate president Jefferson Davis for
permission to undertake the campaign in New Mexico, he predictably put
the best possible face on the venture to assuage any doubts his commanderin-chief might hold. Sibley insisted that the federal army was in disarray and
that the region was filled with Anglo secessionists who would readily support
the Confederate cause. He even suggested that the Hispanic population would
gladly contribute provisions and recruits to the southern effort. Furthermore,
the conquest of the Southwest could be completed with minimal expense to
the Confederate government. The Texas army, Sibley noted, could simply
live off the land and the supplies captured from Union forces. The promise
of great success with little sacrifice was too good to be true, but it did not
prevent Davis from granting Sibley a commission as brigadier general and
sanctioning the campaign.17
While Sibley trusted that New Mexicans would support the Confederate
cause, Union leaders doubted that Hispanics would enthusiastically rally
behind the United States. In June 1861, reports of a planned New Mexican
uprising specifically against Anglos reached U.S. authorities. Although the
rumored date for the rising passed uneventfully, the credence given to such
stories betrayed the uncertainty of federal officials. “The Mexican people
have no affection for the institutions of the United States,” Canby warned
in January 1862. “They have a strong, but hitherto restrained, hatred for the
Americans as a race, and there are not wanting persons who . . . have secretly
but industriously endeavored to keep alive all the elements of discontent and
fan them into flames.” Canby considered Mexicans to be an “ignorant” and
“impulsive” people prone to the machinations of Southern sympathizers,
but he failed to take into account that a long-standing hatred of Texans far
outweighed whatever general ill will they harbored against Americans. Just as
Texans bitterly recalled past examples of Mexican treachery, New Mexicans
recollected instances of Texan “barbarity.” The Santa Fe and Mier expeditions
of 1841 and 1842, in particular, remained effective rallying points. Federal
territorial authorities, who urged men to volunteer not out of loyalty to the
United States but to protect their families from the dreaded “Tejanos,” used
the image of the savage Texan with great success.18
Most New Mexicans made no secret of their hatred for Texans, and if Sibley
genuinely expected the population to support his cause, he must have been
disappointed. Although a few native New Mexicans joined Colonel Baylor’s
command early on, some twenty-eight hundred Hispanic men had enlisted
in Union regiments by February 1862. Whatever Sibley wished to believe,
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the decision of a Southern-sympathizing oligarchy of ricos (rich landowners)
and Anglos to create a Confederate Territory of Arizona hardly represented
the majority will. The failure to recognize that the conquest of New Mexico
also required a conquest of hearts and minds was a colossal mistake, one
compounded by yet another false assumption: contrary to Sibley’s assertion,
it would be extraordinarily difficult for an army to live off the land in the
arid Southwest. Given the low regard in which most Confederates held
New Mexicans, they probably did not possess the wherewithal or patience
to convince the Hispanic population of their struggle’s righteousness. The
Confederates ruthlessly foraging with impunity virtually guaranteed that New
Mexicans would fight against them rather than rally around their cause.19
Nevertheless, Sibley appeared to start his campaign in the right direction.
In December 1861, shortly after his army crossed into New Mexico, he issued
and published in English and Spanish a seemingly magnanimous decree to
the people of the territory. The Confederate Army of New Mexico, he assured
the native population, came not as conquerors but as “liberators” who sought
to relieve the people of the “iniquitous exactions” of the U.S. government.
Had Confederates acted in the spirit of the proclamation, they might have
wooed Hispanic support to their cause. The reality of Confederate policies
was closer to occupation than liberation. Although Sibley promised salvation
from a “military despotism,” Confederate-occupied portions of the territory
remained under martial law during his campaign, citizens were forced to
swear oaths of loyalty to the Confederacy, and the “iniquitous exactions” of
the United States were replaced by Confederate equivalents in the form of
confiscations. He pledged to protect private property, but Sibley also made
clear that New Mexicans had to make available on the “open market” the
forage and supplies necessary to sustain his army and accept payment for the
goods in Confederate dollars at “fair prices.” He promised stiff penalties for
subterfuge: “If destroyed or removed to prevent me from availing myself of
them, those who so co-operate with our enemies will be treated accordingly,
and must prepare to share their fate.” By failing to distinguish between civilians
who concealed supplies in order to aid the Union and those who did so to
prevent starvation, Sibley turned nearly everyone in the territory against the
Confederacy.20
From the time they entered the territory, Sibley’s men acted as a hostile
army in a foreign country. Categorizing New Mexicans as an inferior people
helped justify taking food, animals, clothing, and other property. One Union
informer thought the Texans resembled a mob more than a disciplined army:
“They have acted about El Paso in such a manner as to enrage the whole
community against them. All Mexicans are down on them, and they will
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find very little sympathy when they return. . . . Blankets, onions, wine, and
everything they can lay their hands on they carry off.” Nor was property their
sole interest, as the actions of one hapless volunteer killed by enraged citizens
demonstrated. “The [authorities] said that [he] had assaulted or insulted a
Mexican woman in her house, that she ran out of the house screaming,”
reported a doubting comrade. The episode did little to improve relations
between Texans and New Mexicans. With great effort, Confederate officers
convinced their men not to burn the town in retribution for their compatriot’s
murder. The El Paso informer corroborated reports of unruly behavior: “The
officers have no control over them, and they do just as they please, and you
know what men off a long trip please to do; females neither in nor out of
their houses are safe.”21
Confederate brigandage in El Paso was but a prelude. Around Mesilla,
New Mexico, individual soldiers, enforcing their “fair price,” stole what they
needed, grazed their horses in New Mexican wheat fields, and cheated
vendors already reluctant to accept Confederate money. Confederate
depredations in southern New Mexico put local residents on guard
everywhere, and supplying the army turned increasingly difficult for Sibley’s
quartermaster and commissary officers. Civilians who initially welcomed
the opportunity to sell what little surplus they possessed now shied away,
unwilling to have their goods stolen, confiscated, or paid for in worthless
scrip. Frustrated Texans, who assumed New Mexicans would provide for
them, forcibly quartered themselves in houses of reluctant hosts and coerced
village officials into providing basic commodities such as firewood. Many
Texans believed—correctly in part—that New Mexicans concealed their goods
at the behest of federal authorities, but the more immediate worry of the local
population was protecting itself and private property from the ravenous horde
of Confederates. William Davidson of the Fourth Texas recalled: “My special
duty was to . . . scour the country for food and provisions. . . . The enemy
moved everything to eat out of the country and persuaded the Mexicans to hide
their corn and wheat and drive their cattle and sheep beyond our reach.” In a
period of three days, Davidson managed to secure over one hundred bushels
of wheat, two hundred bushels of corn, and several mules. Such excursions
continued as the Army of New Mexico wound its way up the Rio Grande Valley.
Confederates confiscated goods in excess of three thousand dollars, teams of
oxen, and a sizable flock of sheep near Valverde, New Mexico. At Santa Fe,
they seized thirty thousand dollars worth of “government property” as residents
scrambled to conceal personal possessions.22
Yet, hunger constantly plagued Confederate forces no matter how
efficiently they foraged. With the loss of their supply train at the Battle
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of Glorieta Pass, Confederates faced the unpleasant choice of starving or
retreating. In the end, they did both. “Our army cannot be subsisted here,”
admitted a Texan following the disaster, “and the enemy has only to wait
a few weeks till famine runs us out, to possess the country quietly again.”
Sibley’s plan to support his army through foraging proved both impractical
and counterproductive. Colonel Baylor remarked that the actions of Sibley’s
troops destroyed the “good will” of the people. Other observers agreed. A
resident of Mesilla reported, “[T]he Southern soldiers . . . have consumed
and destroyed everything, even to the growing crops. The people here are
with their eyes open toward the North, in the hope of being relieved from
the devastation of these locusts.”23
Texans, in turn, blamed “ignorant” New Mexicans for sabotaging the
campaign, failing to acknowledge that their own abuses attributed much
to the New Mexicans’ passive and active resistance. Starr insisted that New
Mexicans “looked upon us with fear, having been told that we had come to
revenge the treatment of the Santa Fe Prisoners [of 1841]. They will favor the
most powerful side, and all the time that we were there they doubted our
ability to hold the country, and took every opportunity to keep the enemy
well informed of our proceedings and movements.” Sibley, too, was widely
censured for the failure; he spent much of the campaign confined to an
ambulance—drunk, according to rumors. As the commanding general, Sibley
could escape the wrath of his soldiers, but New Mexican civilians could not.
“My troops,” he keenly observed, “have manifested a dogged irreconcilable
detestation of the Country and the People.”24
Ragged and hungry, harried by Union forces, and disgusted with officers
and civilians alike, the disillusioned volunteers eventually succumbed to
panic, and the Confederate retreat to Mesilla in spring 1862 devolved into a
nightmare of deprivation and desperation. The army had stripped the valley
of food and supplies during the northern advance, leaving little to sustain
them on the return trip. Still, the Texans foraged with zeal. Confederate troops
confiscated livestock, wheat, corn, whiskey, tobacco, and even strings of red
chile peppers. A resident of Las Lunas, New Mexico, reported that soldiers
stole four thousand dollars worth of his property. Toward the end, the army
practically dissolved into a mob. An El Paso merchant who observed the
withdrawal described its utter defeat and desperation to General Canby: “The
Second Regiment [Colonel Thomas Green’s Fifth Texas Mounted Rifles] is
scattered in parties of 15 or 20 along the road . . . committing outrages upon
the inhabitants they meet [on] the highway. They are almost on the point
of starvation. . . . The Mexican population are much enraged against them
on account of their rude treatment.” The Army of New Mexico cleaned out
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the Mesilla Valley so thoroughly that the merchant feared that famine might
stalk the people.25
Emboldened by the Confederate defeat and retreat, New Mexicans
refused all Confederate scrip and demanded hard currency. Texans’ foraging
expeditions sometimes led to bloody clashes that aggravated the animosity
between Texans and New Mexicans. If volunteers still subscribed to the
idea of Mexican “indifference,” that belief was rudely dispelled. In April a
citizen militia surrounded the camp of a dozen Texans near the village of Los
Padillas. Taken by surprise, one of the volunteers dropped his pistols to signal
his surrender. The militiamen ignored the gesture and shot him through the
chest. In the ensuing firefight, another Texan was killed and one wounded.
Word of the encounter enraged the Texans. “We heard this morning that two
of our men were killed last night sometime, or this morning, by the citizens
. . . and a company was sent back to demolish the town,” reported Alfred B.
Peticolas of the Fourth Texas Mounted Rifles. “Before they left the place,”
recounted another, “they [avenging soldiers] sent a few greasers to their father,
the devil, in payment for their treachery.”26
By May, Sibley had fled the territory, leaving his tattered army to fend
for itself. For the next several months, the remainder of the volunteers
continued to battle with civilians as they made their way to Mesilla and then
across the scorching plains of West Texas toward San Antonio. “Instead of
fighting Yankees since Sibley left, we have to fight the Mexicans,” declared a
volunteer. “They refused to let us have transportation, and we went to press
them into service, thereby creating a civil war with them.” Near the village
of Isleta, Texas, a forage party rounded up what cattle they could find and,
having nothing to offer in exchange, simply seized them. When a village
official threatened to attack if they did not return the livestock promptly, the
Texans took cover and prepared for a fight. They shot and killed a civilian
rider, whom they surmised was running for help, and later made their escape
under the cover of darkness. In early July at Mesilla, a clash between New
Mexicans and another foraging party left one officer and six soldiers dead
and as many as forty civilians killed or wounded. The fighting had been close
and personal, and a Confederate lieutenant allegedly stabbed three civilians
with a bowie knife.27
Perhaps the most violent confrontation between civilians and soldiers
occurred in Socorro, Texas. This tiny village in the far western part of the
state unfortunately sat directly in the path of the retreating Confederate
army. In mid-June, an officer of the Seventh Texas requisitioned a number
of beeves from the citizens and refused to pay when they were delivered. A
gunfight followed, leaving several Confederates wounded. The incensed
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Texans trained their artillery on the village. “We killed 20 and wounded a
great many,” wrote one soldier, “besides destroying their church and otherwise
damaging the town.” Several weeks later, another detachment of foragers
visited Socorro, but wise to the ways of the Texans, a mob of some fifty citizens
quickly ran them out.28
Union Defense of New Mexico
Although New Mexicans suffered plundering, violence, and some deaths at
the hands of their Texan “liberators,” they were treated little better by the
Union forces. Union officials were unclear about or doubted the loyalty of the
New Mexican citizens, particularly wealthy families. Union leaders enacted
harsh policies designed to police a suspect population as much as to counter
a Confederate invasion. Like General Sibley, Union colonel Canby, and
later Col. James H. Carleton, ordered New Mexicans to make draft animals,
forage, weapons, and other supplies available for purchase, or they might
be seized outright. Men were pressed into service a full year before military
conscription became national law. Territorial officials exhorted men to defend
their families from the Texans. Scattered evidence suggests the impressment
policy was sometimes brutally implemented by Union authorities and widely
resented by New Mexicans.
In early January 1862, Ickis noted the conspicuous absence of men from
a village in the northern part of the territory. “There are no men in the
town,” he wrote. “They are skulking over the Mts to keep out of sight of
the Territorial pressman who are knabbing [sic] every man who is able to
carry a musket and into the militia they go.” Hispanic men of fighting age
were hesitant to leave their families unprotected and reluctant to join the
poorly equipped and scantily paid militia. They were commonly branded as
cowards, and unwilling recruits frequently clashed with the Union military.
One would-be Union recruit recounted his story to Peticolas, who recorded:
“They [federals] knocked him down, and he showed us a bayonet wound
where they stabbed him trying to force him along anyhow. He told us that
there was many a man sick that they had forced into the service, but that no
one was allowed to stop or rest on that account, but was forced along by the
federals.”29
These recruiting practices implied that Union officials looked upon New
Mexicans as less a people to defend than a resource to exploit. Nowhere
was this attitude more apparent than in the widespread foraging by Union
troops during the campaign. Suffering from the same subsistence problems
that plagued Confederates, Union volunteers gobbled up all the supplies
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they could locate. The plundering committed by the Colorado volunteers
in particular rivaled the thoroughness of the Texans. When word of their
depredations reached Denver, one soldier explained to the Rocky Mountain
News: “Rumors have probably reached you, with a thousand tongues, of the
jay hawking propensities of the members of the Colorado First. . . . Our duty
was onward, and onward we marched, seizing all that was necessary to assist
us in preventing the traitor’s foot from impressing the soil of New Mexico,
and in doing it, though it might inflict individual losses, we believed we were
doing our duty.” Ickis admitted frankly in his diary that “the Col 1st are death
on chickens and sheep or beef. [T]hey steal all they see along the road. [T]
hey stole an entire store in Los Notres. [T]here was about $1000 worth of
goods in it.” Their racial conceptions of New Mexicans undoubtedly shaded
the reasoning of many Coloradoans. One volunteer stated, “they say if the
Mexicans will not fight for their country they must support those who will.”
The notion that New Mexicans were cowards, traitors, cheats, and thieves
deserving such treatment was a common refrain among Colorado volunteers.
Ovando J. Hollister, who helped sack the Pueblo of Sandia, absolved his
conscience by declaring that he and his comrades were no worse than the
native population. “A man that won’t steal,” he quipped, “has no business in
New Mexico.”30
The departure of Sibley’s Texans and the arrival of Colonel Carleton
and his California column restored a modicum of order to New Mexico
Territory. Martial law, however, remained in effect until the end of the war.
Citizens forced by Sibley to swear an oath of loyalty to the Confederacy were
now compelled to proclaim their allegiance to the Union. The army also
confiscated the property of suspected Confederate collaborators, forced men
to labor on fortifications without compensation, and ordered citizens to sell
their crops to the Union army at the ridiculously low price of three dollars per
fanega (about one and a half bushels) or risk their confiscation. The policy
to concentrate foodstuffs in the hands of the federal military met with much
civilian resistance. This backlash prompted one of Carleton’s subordinates
to declare all residents found with more than a two-month supply of food
stores as enemies of the United States. Rather than comply with the directive,
many New Mexicans simply abandoned their lands and carried their surplus
crops into Mexico.31
All these federal policies were designed to thwart future armed incursions
from Texas. Carleton did not intend to tyrannize the population, but he made
perfectly clear his willingness to sacrifice native New Mexicans to prevent such
a recurrence. He ordered his lieutenants to counter the Texans with a scorchedearth campaign in the event of another invasion. As a last-ditch impediment
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to a future Confederate incursion, Carleton also urged New Mexicans to
wage a people’s war against the Texans. “Remind the Mexicans of how they
were robbed before,” he exhorted his subordinates, “and animate them . . .
with a settled determination to attack the enemy from every cover.”32
Carleton’s vision was an explosive proposition. An inherently bloodthirsty method, irregular warfare became all the more brutal when fanned
by racial animosity. The sporadic guerrilla actions at the end of Sibley’s
New Mexico campaign indicated that a renewed conflict with the Texans
was likely to become an extraordinarily bloody affair. Indeed, the excessive
and indiscriminate violence engendered by guerrilla war had motivated
Northern and Southern leaders alike to condemn the practice, decry guerrillas
as “brigands” and “outlaws,” and support their summary execution when
captured. That Carleton felt justified in calling for partisan action when
leaders in similar straits balked at such a drastic measure is not surprising
given his reputation for ruthlessness toward national enemies—be they Texans
or Indians. Carleton may also have assumed that he was merely sanctioning
the inevitable; New Mexicans had already demonstrated their readiness to
oppose Confederate depredations. Regardless, his willingness to exploit their
passions evidenced a startling disregard for the pyrrhic consequences. That
New Mexicans, rather than Anglos, would bear the brunt of Confederate
reprisals doubtless made his decision more palatable.33
Fortunately for New Mexicans, the high tide of the Confederacy in
the Southwest had passed with Sibley’s retreat, and the extreme measures
advocated by Carleton became unnecessary. New Mexico’s strategic
importance and an ongoing Indian threat, however, ensured that a large
military presence and the problems attending it remained. In August 1862,
Maj. Arthur Morrison, an Anglo officer in a New Mexico volunteer regiment,
complained of a seemingly regular occurrence at Polvadera, a hamlet
situated between Socorro, New Mexico, and Albuquerque. “Government
trains passing up and down this route,” Morrison complained, “commit
depredations on private citizens in turning cattle into their fields and
destroying their crops or only subsistence, maltreating animals, occasionally
killing one without necessity.” Pillaging and foraging by individual soldiers
also continued, despite the best efforts of conscientious officers to stop the
practice. After 1 January 1863—the day U.S. president Abraham Lincoln’s
Emancipation Proclamation took effect—soldiers began to “steal” people,
freeing peons from their Hispanic patrons and putting them to work in their
camps. The relationship between Union volunteers and Mexican Americans
remained uneasy throughout the occupied Southwest. American resentment
against “greasers,” and Mexican wariness about the intention of soldados
(soldiers) always held the potential for and sometimes erupted in violence.34
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Reprise of Manifest Destiny
The New Mexico Campaign of 1862 generated several significant consequences
for the Southwest. The defeat of Sibley’s Texans effectively ended the
Confederate bid for a transcontinental empire. The influx of Anglo soldiers,
particularly Californians and Coloradoans, wrought important cultural
and demographic changes in the Southwest. Once considered a national
backwater, the territory of New Mexico and future territory of Arizona received
a good deal of publicity during the campaigns and battles from late 1861
through summer 1862. Many Union volunteers permanently settled there,
and their letters and descriptions of the territory (more generous than those
of the beaten Texans) attracted thousands of settlers and contributed to the
“Americanization” of Hispanic New Mexico. The most visible result of the
campaign was the widespread devastation between Mesilla and Santa Fe
and the famine that followed. Magdalen Hayden, mother superior of Loretto
Academy in Santa Fe, reported: “Our poor and distant territory has not been
spared. The Texans without provocation have sacked and almost ruined the
richest portions and have forced the most respectable families to flee from
their homes.” The war hit Socorro County south of Albuquerque particularly
hard. In 1860 it boasted a population of 5,700 residents. Three years later,
that number had dropped to less than 3,700. Some villages, whose residents
were unable to sustain themselves, virtually disappeared. “The population of
this district, until last year, was much larger than at present,” noted a Union
officer who conducted a census in 1863. “In every town there are houses
locked up and their owners having left in search of food.”35
This devastation occurred rapidly and early in the Civil War. The morality
of widespread “foraging” was hotly disputed in early 1862 but by 1864 the zeal
with which Confederate and Union soldiers plundered the countryside was
legendary. The war escalated for three years before Union major general
William T. Sherman could justify his march of destruction through Georgia.
New Mexico experienced no comparable grace period; pillage, murder, and
destruction came immediately. Although starvation motivated Confederate
plundering and violence in the final stages of the campaign, it does not
explain their mob-like behavior during their first weeks in Mesilla. Similarly,
although hunger may account for why Coloradoans resorted to foraging and
looting, it explains neither why they did so with such apparent glee and selfrighteousness nor their continuing propensity to run roughshod over New
Mexican sensibilities even after the Confederate threat had been blunted.
The notoriously poor discipline among volunteers certainly explains some
of the unrestrained behavior, but this answer is unsatisfying.
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Soldiers’ reactions to the depredations shed some light on the matter. This
author has not discovered a soldier—Texan, Coloradoan, or Californian—
who expressed even a little regret over the hardships inflicted on New
Mexicans. This omission is especially striking when one considers how
Sherman’s men or Confederate general Robert E. Lee’s troops in Pennsylvania
often managed to sound sincerely remorseful, although they insisted on the
necessity and righteousness of their actions. For example a Confederate
officer who entered Pennsylvania determined to avenge the destruction of
his own home was incapable of acting on his anger after he came face to face
with terrified civilians. “Though I had such severe wrongs and grievances to
redress . . . when I got among these people I could not find it in my heart to
molest them,” he confided. “They looked so dreadfully scared and talked, so
humble, that I have invariably endeavored to protect their property.” An officer
in an Ohio regiment, plainly aware of the devastation caused by the army as
it maneuvered toward Atlanta, Georgia, in the summer of 1864, expressed
similar sympathies. “I don’t see what the people in this country are going to
do next winter,” he pondered to his wife. “There will not be anything left
for them to live upon. . . . I sometimes feel sorry for the poorer class as they
were not to blame in bring[ing] on this war. There is more of what is called
poor white trash than I had any idea of.” The expression of pity assumed
that volunteers could empathize with their victims. Empathy required the
recognition of some commonality with their victims, a prerequisite that
volunteers campaigning in the alien culture of New Mexico were hard-pressed
to meet. Hence, while the plight of the Pennsylvania “Dutch” and Georgia’s
“white trash” evoked genuine concern from the soldiers, starvation among
New Mexican “greasers” met only with their indifference.36
Just as a common Anglo identity bound the belligerents, common
assumptions of New Mexican identity influenced their actions. To understand
the implications fully requires viewing the campaign in a wider ideological
context. Despite Sibley’s reassurances to the people of New Mexico, the
invading Texans cared little about “liberating” them from a tyrannical
government. The Texans came, as numerous sources attested, to realize their
manifest destiny. Union forces, too, cared little about the New Mexicans. They
seemed more determined to protect the fruits of their own manifest destiny,
realized some thirteen years earlier when the United States first acquired
the territory after the war with Mexico. Economic exploitation and Anglo
hegemony informed the American philosophy of expansionism. Given these
assumptions, historians should not interpret pillaging and excesses carried
out by volunteers as acts of desperation or a failure of discipline but as the
military application of racial assumptions shared by Anglo Americans in the
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mid-nineteenth century. Simply put their sense of entitlement to the land
and contempt for its people drove their actions.37
The echoes of manifest destiny motivated both Confederate and Union
soldiers in the southwestern theater, making it a unique location in the war.
That particular mandate for continental expansion had little bearing on
common troops elsewhere. Historians have long recognized manifest destiny’s
racialist component, an unpalatable reality of Anglo culture prominently
displayed in New Mexico. This tradition of racialism creates space for more
general conclusions, especially in relation to the ongoing debate over the
“restraint” of the Civil War and the character of the soldiers who comprised
the bulk of its armies. The destructive tendencies of the volunteers, some
argue, were tempered by a keen sense of morality and justice. Union men
discriminated between the “guilty” (wealthy slaveholders) and the “innocent”
(yeoman farmers, women, and children), and favored the destruction of
public over private property. Such civilities, however, were extended only
to members of the same “American” (white) community. Where racial
differences came to the fore, restraint evaporated. A recent study, although
agreeing with this premise, vigorously asserts that race, not morality, was
the determining factor in how soldiers treated civilians. This work further
suggests that compared to the abuse suffered by civilians at the hands of
Americans in other wars, such as the conflict with Mexico or the Indian
wars, much of the violence traditionally assigned to the Civil War has been
grossly exaggerated. In many ways, the actions of volunteers in New Mexico
support these conclusions.38
Although enlightening, a similar comparative approach to the New Mexico
campaign also poses special problems. Such a comparison establishes a
false dichotomy that tends to obscure as much as it illuminates. To Anglo
volunteers, New Mexicans clearly served as the racial “other.” Yet, according
to treaty laws and the territorial constitution, they were in fact legitimate
citizens who theoretically possessed all the rights and privileges of a Boston
Brahmin—unlike blacks and Indians. To separate the war in New Mexico
from the “greater” conflict in the East or to highlight the violence that soldiers
inflicted on Mexican Americans merely to reveal the restraint they exercised
toward white Americans is to propagate the same artificial division imposed
by the volunteers.39
If historians are to address honestly the question of restraint, they must
include the New Mexico campaign in any overview of military-civilian
relations during the war, and it deserves to occupy a place next to
Lee’s invasion of Pennsylvania and Sherman’s march through Georgia.
Rehabilitated from its sideshow status, the campaign’s integration into Civil
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War historiography makes readily apparent that any claim touting the war’s
restraint must be seriously qualified. The lofty ideals of liberty and freedom
and defense of home and hearth—ideals for which soldiers professed to
be fighting—were inextricably bound to oppression, intolerance, and the
maintenance of white privilege. The idea that volunteers by and large directed
their wrath only toward the “guilty,” limited their destruction of private property,
and respected civilians in general and women in particular would surely have
come as a revelation to the “liberated” residents of the Mesilla valley.
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